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 Abstract 
 
This paper evaluates the incentive of firms to vertically integrate in a simple 2X2 Bertrand model of 
two substitutes that are each comprised of two complementary components.  It confirms that all 
prices fall as a result of a vertical merger.  Further, we find that, when the composite goods are poor 
substitutes, producers of complementary components are better off after integration.  Thus, at 
equilibrium, each pair of complementary goods is produced by a single firm (parallel vertical 
integration).  In contrast, when the composite goods are close substitutes, vertical integration 
reduces profits of the merging firms and is therefore undesirable.  Thus, at equilibrium, all four 
products are produced by independent firms (independent ownership).  The reason for the change in 
the direction of the incentive to merge is that, as the composite goods become closer substitutes, 
competition between them reduces prices (in comparison to full monopoly) thereby eliminating the 
usefulness of a vertical merger in accomplishing the same price effect.  We also find that, for 
intermediate levels of substitution, firms producing complementary components prefer to merge 
only if the substitute good is produced by an integrated firm.  Thus, for intermediate levels of 
substitution, both parallel vertical integration and independent ownership are equilibria.  When the 
demand system is symmetric, total surplus is higher in parallel vertical integration, for all degrees of 
substitution among the products, even for the case when the goods are close substitutes and parallel 
vertical integration is not the equilibrium outcome.  Thus, the market provides less vertical 
integration than is optimal from a social surplus maximizing point of view. 
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 The Incentive for Vertical Integration 
1. Introduction 
 
 This paper evaluates the incentive of firms to vertically integrate in a simple setting.  
Cournot (1838) considered the case of two firms that produce complementary components, and 
each is a price-setting monopolist in its product line.  He showed that each of them has an incentive 
to integrate vertically and become a single monopolist, earning higher profits.  In the dual to his 
well-known quantity-setting game, Cournot showed and that the integrated monopolist has a lower 
price than the sum of the prices of two price-setting independent firms.  His results were essentially 
based on the fact that, in a non-cooperative framework, each of two vertically related firms ignores 
the fact that the other one is also collecting a markup.1  Thus, duopoly prices include two markups 
while a monopolist charges a single markup, higher than each of the markups of the duopolists, but 
lower than their sum. 
 
 How do these results fare in the presence of imperfect competition?  The reduction of price 
resulting from vertical integration has been the subject of much discussion, especially in the context 
of the possibility or lack of substitution in the technology that combines the components.2  The 
incentive for vertical integration has received relatively less attention.  This paper will focus on the 
incentives for vertical mergers in a market where two composite goods are substitutes to each other. 
 
 The formulation of this paper is conceptually simple.  I start with the model of Cournot 
where two complementary components are combined in fixed proportions to produce a composite 
good.  I introduce a second composite good comprised of two new complementary components.  I 
then vary the degree of substitution between the two composite goods and assess the incentive for 
vertical mergers.  As long as the two composite goods are distant substitutes, by continuity, the 
result of Cournot must continue to hold: vertical integration of the components of one of the 
composite goods results in a lower price of that good and in higher profits.3  As the composite goods 
become closer substitutes, I show that prices still fall as a result of a vertical merger.  However, I 
also show that, when the composite goods are relatively close substitutes, a vertical merger results 
in a reduction of the total profits of the merged entities, and therefore it is undesirable to the 
merging firms. 
 
 Why does the incentive to merge vertically change as the degree of substitution changes, 
and in particular why are vertical mergers unprofitable in the presence of close substitutes?  To give 
an intuitive answer to this question, we consider four ownership structures, independent ownership, 
                                                 
1  Economists typically use the term “double marginalization for the existence of two margins in complementary 
duopoly resulting in a higher price in duopoly than monopoly. 
 
2  See, for example, Schmalensee (1973), Greenhut and Ohta (1979), and Salinger (1988, 1989), among others. 
 
3  Of course this result has to be slightly qualified to make sure that the increase in price of composite good 1 is 
sustained in the presence of a substitute.  Further, it is of interest to observe the effects of vertical integration on the 
price of the substitute composite good. 
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where each of the four components is produced by a separate firm; partial vertical integration, 
where a single firm produces the two components that comprise the first composite good, while the 
two components of the second composite good are each produced by separate firms; parallel 
vertical integration, where for each composite good, the pair of components comprising it are 
produced by the same firm; and joint ownership, where all components are produced by the same 
firm.  A merger between one of the pairs of firms that produce complementary components changes 
the market structure from independent ownership to partial vertical integration.  A further merger 
between the two firms that produce the other two complementary components changes the market 
structure from partial vertical integration to parallel vertical integration.  From the point of view of 
the vertically integrated firm, Cournot’s world of a single composite good is identical to our setting 
with zero substitution among the two composite goods, since, for zero substitution, the outcomes of 
partial vertical integration, parallel vertical integration, and joint ownership coincide. 
 
 The most important effect of a vertical merger is a reduction of all prices because of the 
elimination of double marginalization.  When there is zero (or very weak) substitution between the 
composite goods, the reduction in price is desirable to the merged firms because it leads them away 
from the distortion of double marginalization and into full (or almost full) monopoly profits.  
However, when the composite goods are closer substitutes, the price reduction from the equilibrium 
prices of independent ownership is not necessarily desirable to the merging firms.  This is because, 
when the composite goods are close substitutes, competition in the composite goods market drives 
prices under independent ownership below the prices of joint ownership.  A merger that changes 
market structure from independent ownership to partial vertical integration reduces the prices even 
further, again below the prices of joint ownership.  Thus, when the composite goods are close 
substitutes, the major effect of the merger in reducing the prices of the merging firms (because of 
the elimination of double marginalization) is detrimental to the merging firm, which instead would 
like to find a way to increase prices.  It follows that when the composite goods are close enough 
substitutes, independent firms producing complements prefer not to merge.  Thus, this argument 
shows that as the composite goods become closer substitutes, competition between them reduces 
prices (in comparison to joint ownership) thereby eliminating the usefulness of a vertical merger in 
accomplishing the same price effect. 4  A similar argument shows that the remaining independent 
firms under partial vertical integration would like to stay independent if the composite goods are 
sufficiently close substitutes. 
 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the basic model.  Section 3 
presents the equilibria in the various ownership structures.  Section 4 discusses the individual 
incentive of firms to integrate.  This section contains the essential comparisons of prices and profits 
across ownership structures.  Section 5 defines the equilibrium ownership structures in the full 
game.  Section 6 presents concluding remarks. 
 
                                                 
4  Our setting has firms choosing their prices simultaneously.  Our general results also hold when prices are chosen 
sequentially, as for example when one of the firms chooses its price after the price for the complementary good has 
been disclosed. 
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2. The Model 
 
 Let there be two types of goods, A  and  B, which are complementary to each other.  Let 
there be two varieties of each type of good, A1, A2, B1 and B2.  Ai  is combinable with  Bi  to form 
composite good  AiBi.  Thus, consumers demand composite goods  A1B1  and  A2B2  that are 
assumed to be substitutes. 
 
 We consider four possible market structures.  In the first market structure (independent 
ownership, “I”), there are four independent firms, each producing one of the four components.  In 
the second market structure (partial vertical integration, “PVI”), components  Ai  and  Bi  are 
produced by the same firm (i = 1 or 2), while components  Aj  and  Bj  (j = 1 or 2; j ≠ i) are each 
produced by an independent firm.  In the third market structure (parallel vertical integration, 
“PLVI”), components  A1  and  B1  are produced by the same firm (firm 1), and components  A2  
and  B2  are produced by the same firm (firm 2).  In the fourth (reference) market structure (joint 
ownership, “J”), all components are produced by the same firm.  Figure 1 shows all these market 
structures.  Products contained in the same box are sold by the same firm.  Since we want to focus 
on vertical mergers, we do not consider other ownership structures, where a single firm controls one 
component of each composite good. 
 
 We model competition as a two-stage game.  Firms choose the degree of integration in stage 
1 by deciding if they will merge, while prices are chosen in stage 2.  We seek subgame-perfect 
equilibria. 
 
 
3. Equilibria in the Price Games 
3.1 Independent Ownership 
 
 We first find all non-cooperative equilibria in price subgames for every ownership structure. 
In the regime of independent ownership (I), each of the four components is provided by a different  
firm.  Firm  Ai, i = 1, 2, sells component  Ai  at price  pi, and firm  Bj, j = 1, 2, sells component  Bj  at 
price  qj.  Thus, composite good  A1B1  is sold at  p1 + q1, and composite good  A2B2  is sold at  p2 + 
q2.  Let a single consumer have a quadratic utility function in  A1B1  and  A2B2  which is separable 
in the outside good D0, i.e., 
 
 U(D0, D1, D2) = D0 + α1D1 + α2D2 – (β1D12 + β2D22 + 2γD1D2)/2. (1) 
 
with  α1, α2, β1, β2, γ > 0.  Maximization of utility  U(D0, D1, D2)  subject to the budget constraint  
D0 + (p1 + q1)D1 + (p2 + q2)D2 = I  yields linear inverse demands 
 
 p1 + q1 = α1 - β1D1 - γD2,   p2 + q2 = α2 - γD1 - β2D2. (2) 
 
As long as  β1β2 ≠ γ2, this system can be inverted to give the demand equations for A1B1  and  A2B2  
 
 D1 = a1 - b1(p1 + q1) + c(p2 + q2),  D2 = a2 + c(p1 + q1) - b2(p2 + q2). (3) 
  4
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with  a1 = (α1β2 - α2γ)/(β1β2 - γ2),  a2 = (α2β1 - α1γ)/(β1β2 - γ2),  b1 = β2/(β1β2 - γ2),  b2 = β1/(β1β2 - γ2),  
c = γ/(β1β2 - γ2).  The expression  σ = c2/(b1b2) = γ2/(β1β2)  measures the degree of substitution 
between the two composite goods.  It can be shown that σ = ε12ε21/(ε11ε22), where  εii  is the own 
elasticity of demand of composite good i and  εij  is the cross elasticity of demand of good i with 
respect to changes in the price of good j.5   Thus, the degree of substitution σ measures the relative 
size of cross elasticities in comparison with the own elasticity of demand.  A zero value for σ means 
that the two composite goods A1B1  and  A2B2 are independent.  Restricting  b1, b2, and  c  to 
positive and finite values implies σ = γ2/(β1β2) < 1.6  Thus, we restrict the degree of substitution σ to 
lie in the range [0, 1). 
                                                 
5  Since  ε11 = (∂D1/∂p1)/(D1/(p1 + q1)), ε12 = (∂D1/∂p2)/(D1/(p2 + q2)), we have  -ε11/ε12 = b1(p1 + q1))/(c(p2 + q2)).  
Similarly, -ε22/ε21 = b2(p2 + q2)/(c(p1 + q1)), so that  ε12ε21/(ε11ε22) = c2/(b1b2) = γ2/(β1β2) = σ. 
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 At the consumer’s optimal choice (D0*, D1*, D2*), the realized consumers’ surplus is7 
 
 CS = U(D0*, D1*, D2*) = I + (β1D1*2 + β2D2*2 + 2γD1*D2*)/2. (4) 
 
Under the assumption of zero costs, the profit functions are8 
 
 ΠA1 = p1D1 = p1[a1 - b1(p1 + q1) + c(p2 + q2)],   ΠB1 = q1D1 = q1[a1 - b1(p1 + q1) + c(p2 + q2)], 
 
 ΠA2 = p2D2 = p2[a2 + c(p1 + q1) - b2(p2 + q2)],   ΠB2 = q2D2 = q2[a2 + c(p1 + q1) - b2(p2 + q2)]. 
 (5a,b, c, d) 
 
The solution of the individual firms’ profit maximization conditions,9  ∂ΠA1/∂p1 = ∂ΠB1/∂q1 =  
∂ΠA2/∂p2 = ∂ΠB2/∂q2 = 0, defines the equilibrium prices and profits:10 
 
 p1I = q1I = (3a1b2 + 2a2c)/(9b1b2 - 4c2),  p2I = q2I = (3a2b1 + 2a1c)/(9b1b2 - 4c2). (6a,b) 
 
 ΠIA1 = Π
I
B1 = b1(3a1b2 + 2a2c)
2/(9b1b2 - 4c2)2,  ΠIA2 = Π
I
B2 = b2(3a2b1 + 2a1c)
2/(9b1b2 - 4c2)2. 
 (7a,b) 
 
 
3.2 Partial Vertical Integration 
 
 In partial vertical integration (“PVI”), components A1 and B1 are sold by the same firm, 
while A2 and B2 are each provided independently.  Let the price of good A1B1 (provided by 
                                                                                                                                                             
6  b1, b2, c > 0  requires  β1β2 - γ2 > 0, i.e., σ = γ2/(β1β2) < 1.  A slightly stronger restriction, b1 > c, b2 > c, (equivalent to  
β1 > γ, β2 > γ) can be interpreted as “an increase in the price of all differentiated goods reduces the demand for each 
good.”  This restriction is commonly used in oligopoly models.  To have  a1, a2 > 0, we require  α1β2 > α2γ  and  α2β1 > 
α1γ. 
 
7  From the budget constraint, D0 = I - (p1 + q1)D1 - (p2 + q2)D2 = I - α1D1 - α2D2 + β1D12 + β2D22 + 2γD1D2.  
Substituting in the definition of  U(D0, D1, D2)  yields  CS = U(D0*, D1*, D2*) = I + (β1D1*2 + β2D2*2 + 2γD1*D2*)/2. 
 
8  Clearly the same results hold for non-zero but constant marginal costs. 
 
9  Second order conditions also hold. 
 
10  In terms of the parameters of the utility function, the equilibrium prices, demand and profits are  
 
  p1I = q1I = (3α1β1β2 - α2β1γ - 2α1γ2)/(9β1β2 - 4γ2),   p2I = q2I = (3α2β1β2 - α1β2γ - 2α2γ2)/(9β1β2 - 4γ2),  
 
 D1I = β2(3α1β1β2 - α2β1γ - 2α1γ2)/((β1β2 - γ2)(9β1β2 - 4γ2)),  D2I = β1(3α2β1β2 - α1β2γ - 2α2γ2)/((β1β2 - γ2)(9β1β2 - 4γ2)),  
 
 ΠIA1 = Π
I
B1 = β2(3α1β1β2 - α2β1γ - 2α1γ
2)2/[(9β1β2 - 4γ2)2(β1β2 - γ2)],   
 
 ΠIA2 = Π
I
B2 = β1(3α2β1β2 - α1β1γ - 2α2γ
2)2/[(9β1β2 - 4γ2)2(β1β2 - γ2)]. 
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integrated firm 1) be  s1.  The prices of the two components  A2  and  B2  of the second good are  p2  
and  q2  as before.  The demand and profit functions are now 
 D1 = a1 - b1s1 + c(p2 + q2),  D2 = a2 + cs1 - b2(p2 + q2),   (8a, b) 
 
 Π1 = s1D1 = s1(a1 - b1s1 + c(p2 + q2)),    (9a) 
 
 ΠA2 = p2D2 = p2(a2 + cs1 - b2(p2 + q2)),   ΠB2 = q2D2 = q2(a2 + cs1 - b2(p2 + q2)). (9b, c) 
 
 The solution of the individual firms’ profit maximization conditions,11 ∂Π1/∂s1 = ∂ΠA2/∂p2 = 
∂ΠB2/∂q2 = 0, defines the equilibrium prices s1PVI for A1B1, p2PVI for A2, and q2PVI for B2 as 
 
 s1PVI = (3a1b2 + 2a2c)/(6b1b2 - 2c2), (10a) 
 
 p2PVI = q2PVI = (2a2b1 + a1c)/(6b1b2 - 2c2). (10b) 
 
Note that, if the demands for the two composite goods are equal at equal prices (i.e., if a1 = a2  and  
b1 = b2), the composite good of the unintegrated firms is sold at a higher price, p2PVI + q2PVI > s1PVI.  
This is because the unintegrated firms faces double marginalization. 
 
 Equilibrium profits are12 
 
 Π1PVI = b1(3a1b2 + 2a2c)2/[4(3b1b2 - c2)2], (11a) 
 
 ΠA2
PVI = ΠB2
PVI = b2(2a2b1 + a1c)2/[4(3b1b2 - c2)2].  (11b) 
 
 
3.3 Parallel Vertical Integration 
 
 We now consider parallel vertical integration (“PLVI”), where each substitute composite 
good is provided by an integrated firm.  Let the price of composite good  AiBi  (sold by integrated 
firm i) be  si, i = 1, 2.  Demand and profit functions are now 
                                                 
11 ∂Π1/∂s1 = a1 - 2b1s1 + c(p2 + q2) = 0, ∂ΠA2/∂p2 = a2 + cs1 - 2b2p2 - b2q2 = 0, ∂ΠB2/∂q2 = a2 + cs1 - 2b2q2 - b2p2 = 0. 
 
12  In terms of the parameters of the utility function, the equilibrium prices, demand, and profits are  
 
 s1PVI = (3α1β1β2 - α2β1γ - 2α1γ2)/[2(3β1β2 - γ2)],  p2PVI = q2PVI = (2α2β1β2 - α1β2γ - α2γ2)/[2(3β1β2 - γ2)], 
 
 D1PVI = β2(3α1β1β2 - α2β1γ - 2α1γ2)/(2(β1β2 - γ2)(3β1β2 - γ2)),  
 
D2PVI = β1(2α2β1β2 - α1β2γ - α2γ2)/(2(β1β2 - γ2)(3β1β2 - γ2)), 
 
 Π1PVI = β2(3α1β1β2 - α2β1γ - 2α1γ2)2/[4(β1β2 - γ2)(3β1β2 - γ2)2], 
 
ΠA2
PVI = ΠB2
PVI = β1(2α2β1β2 - α1β2γ - α2γ2)2/[4(β1β2 - γ2)(3β1β2 - γ2)2]. 
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 D1 = a1 - b1s1 + cs2,  D2 = a2 + cs1 - b2s2,  Π1 = s1D1,  Π2 = s2D2.       (12a, b, c, d) 
 
The solution of the individual profit maximization conditions,13 ∂Π1/∂s1 = ∂Π2/∂s2 = 0, defines the 
equilibrium prices and profits as14 
 
 s1PLVI = (2a1b2 + a2c)/(4b1b2 - c2),  s2PLVI = (2a2b1 + a1c)/(4b1b2 - c2), (13a,b) 
 
 Π1PLVI = b1(2a1b2 + a2c)2/(4b1b2 - c2)2,  Π2PLVI = b2(2a2b1 + a1c)2/(4b1b2 - c2)2. (13c,d) 
 
 
3.4 Joint Ownership 
 
 In joint ownership (“J”), all products are sold by the same firm.  Its profit function is 
 
 Π = Π1 + Π2 = s1D1 + s2D2 = s1(a1 - b1s1 + cs2) + s2(a2 + cs1 - b2s2),       (14) 
 
The solution of first order conditions, ∂Π/∂s1 = ∂Π/∂s2 = 0, defines the equilibrium prices 
 
 s1J = (a1b2 + a2c)/[2(b1b2 - c2)],  s2J = (a2b1 + a1c)/[2(b1b2 - c2)]. (15a, b) 
 
Equilibrium profits from  A1B1  and  A2B2  are 
 
 Π1J = [a1(a1b2 + a2c)]/[4(b1b2 - c2)],  Π2J = [a2(a2b1 + a1c)]/[4(b1b2 - c2)]. (16) 
 
so that the total profits of the monopolist are15 
 
 ΠJ = Π1J + Π2J = (a12b2 +a22b1 + 2a2a1c)]/[4(b1b2 - c2)].  (17) 
 
 
4. The Choice to Integrate Vertically 
4.1 Mergers that Lead from Independent Ownership to Partial Vertical Integration 
                                                 
 
13  They are  ∂Π1/∂s1 = a1 - 2b1s1 + cs2 = 0  (as in parallel vertical integration), and ∂Π2/∂s2 = a2 + cs1 - 2b2s2 = 0. 
 
14  In terms of the parameters of the utility function, the equilibrium prices, demand, and profits are 
 
s1PLVI = (2α1β1β2 - α2β1γ - α1γ2)/(4β1β2 - γ2),s2PLVI = (2α2β1β2 - α1β2γ - α2γ2)/(4β1β2 - γ2), 
 
 D1PLVI = β2(2α1β1β2 - α2β1γ - α1γ2)/((β1β2 - γ2)(4β1β2 - γ2)),  D2PLVI = β1(2α2β1β2 - α1β2γ - α2γ2)/((β1β2 - γ2)(4β1β2 - γ2)), 
 
 Π1PLVI = β2(2α1β1β2 - α2β1γ - α1γ2)2/[(β1β2 - γ2)(4β1β2 - γ2)2],  Π2PLVI = β1(2α2β1β2 - α1β2γ - α2γ2)2/[(β1β2 - γ2)(4β1β2 - γ2)2]. 
 
15  In terms of the parameters of the utility function, the equilibrium prices and profits are  s1J = α1/2, s2J = α2/2,  ΠJ = 
(α22β1 + α12β2 - 2α1α2γ)/[4(β1β2 - γ2)]. 
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 We are interested in the comparison of prices and profits across regimes.  We are most 
interested in the comparisons of profits or losses from mergers that lead to vertical integration.  
Starting with “independent ownership” where all components are produced by independent firms,  
we consider a merger of firms  A1  and  B1.  Such a merger will result in “partial vertical 
integration.”  We first compare prices.  All prices fall as a result of the merger,16 
 
 s1PVI < p1I + q1I,  p2PVI < p2I.  (18) 
 
The reduction in price is a direct effect of the elimination of double marginalization and is true 
under weak restrictions on general demand functions.  Keeping for the moment the prices of firms  
A2  and B2  constant, we note that  ∂Π1PVI/∂s1 = ∂ΠIA1/∂p1 + ∂ΠIB1/∂p1 = ∂ΠIB1/∂p1 < 0, when evaluated 
at the equilibrium prices of independent ownership, as long as  A1  and  B1  are complements.  
Given the concavity of  Π1PVI, the integrated firm chooses a smaller price for  A1B1  (as a response to  
p2 + q2) than the sum of the prices of its components chosen by independent firms in independent 
ownership. Since the composite goods are strategic complements, the competitors reduce prices in 
response.17,18 
 
 Proposition 1:  Starting with independent ownership, a vertical merger of firms A1 and B1 
(or A2 and B2), leading to partial vertical integration, reduces all prices. 
 
 We now compare the profits of the firms that merge as we move from independent 
ownership to partial vertical integration.  The incentive for firms  A1  and  B1  to merge is measured 
by  Π1PVI - (ΠIA1 + Π
I
B1).  We find that this is negative when the composite goods are close 
substitutes: for σ  < 0.44,19 where  σ = c2/b1b2 = γ2/β1β2  is the degree of substitution between the 
composite goods.  Thus, when the composite goods are not close substitutes, it pays for firms  A1  
and  B1  to merge (given that  A2  and  B2  are independent).  The firms that did not participate in the 
merger are always made worse off as a result of the merger, ΠA2
PVI < ΠiA2, ΠB2
PVI < ΠiB2.
20 
 
                                                 
 
16  p1I + q1I - s1PVI = 3b1b2(3a1b2 + 2a2c)/[2(9b1b2 - 4c2)(3b1b2 - c2)] > 0,  pI2 - p2PVI = b1c(3a1b2 +2a2c)/[2(9b1b2 - 4c2)(3b1b2 - 
c2)] > 0. 
 
17  The reduction in the prices of  A2  and  B2  has an additional dampening effect on  s1. 
 
18  In this model, hybrid composite goods  AiBj, i ≠ j, do not exist, and therefore the mergers considered have only 
vertical effects.  This is in contrast with Economides and Salop (1992) where such “vertical” mergers have both 
horizontal and vertical effects. 
 
19  (ΠIA1 + Π
I
B1) - Π1
PVI = b1(24b1b2c2 - 8c4 - 9b12b22)(3a1b2 + 2a2c)2/[4(9b1b2 - 4c2)2(3b1b2 - c2)2].  In this expression, all 
terms are positive except for the term in the first set of parentheses.  This term can be written as  24b1b2c2 - 8c4 - 9b12b22 
= -(b1b2)2(8σ2 - 24σ + 9) = 8(b1b2)2(2.56 - σ)(σ - 0.44), where  σ = c2/b1b2 = γ2/β1β2.  Since  0 ≤ σ < 1, it follows that  Πi
A1 + ΠiB1 < ΠA1PVI  for relatively small σ, σ < 0.44. 
 
20  ΠIA2 - ΠA2
PVI = {b1b2c(3a1b2 + 2a2c)[a2b1(36b1b2 - 14c2) + a1c(21b1b2 - 8c2)]}/[4(9b1b2-4c2)2(3b1b2 - c2)2] > 0, since  
b1b2 > c2, and similarly for firm  B2. 
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 Proposition 2:  Starting with independent ownership, firms A1 and B1 will find a merger 
with each other to be profitable if and only if the composite goods A1B1 and A2B2 are not close 
substitute, that is, iff σ = c2/b1b2 = γ2/β1β2 < 0.44.  Firms A2 and B2 are always made worse off as a 
result of the above merger. 
 
 To understand these results, we need to elaborate on the effects of the merger on prices.  
Figure 2 shows the equilibrium price for composite good 1 as a function of the degree of 
substitution σ = γ2/β1β2 for independent ownership, partial vertical integration, parallel vertical 
integration, and joint ownership.  The merger causes the composite price to jump from the “I” line 
to the “PVI” line.  For independent composite goods, i.e., for σ = 0,  s1J = s1PVI = s1PLVI.  Therefore at  
σ = 0  (and for small σ), p1I + q1I > s1J.  As the degree of substitution σ increases, competition 
depresses the composite prices in independent ownership in comparison with joint ownership.  
Thus, for high enough σ, p1I + q1I < s1J.  Thus, the reduction in the composite price resulting from the 
merger, although beneficial for small σ because it brings the composite price closer to the composite 
price of joint ownership, is detrimental to the merging firms for large σ because the composite price 
in independent ownership is already close to or lower than the composite price in joint ownership.  
When the composite goods are close substitutes (large σ), firms A2 and B2 are significantly 
disadvantaged as a result of the merger of their rivals A1 and B1.  Not only do their prices fall, but 
also the quantity they produce falls as seen below. 
 
 Consumers’ surplus will rise as long as both quantities increase.  Because the composite 
goods are substitutes, there is no guarantee that a reduction in the price of both goods will reduce the 
quantities sold of both.  It can be shown that the equilibrium demand changes in opposite directions 
as the market structure changes from independent ownership to partial vertical integration.  Despite 
the reduction in both prices as a result of the merger, the quantity of the firms that remain 
independent falls, while the quantity of the merging firms increases.21  Therefore, we cannot use a 
general rule for surplus comparisons, and we have to rely on specific calculations.  In the case of 
symmetric demand, defined by  α1 = α2 = α, β1 = β2 = β, consumers’ surplus rises as we switch from 
independent ownership to partial vertical integration.22  Total welfare, TS = CS + Σi Πi, also 
increases for a very wide range of values of the parameters.23 
 
                                                 
 
21  To see this, note that the demand differences are  D1PVI - D1I = Φβ2(3β1β2 - 2γ2)/[2(β1β2 - γ2)(3β1β2 - γ2)(9β1β2 - 4γ2)],  
D2PVI - D2I = -Φβ1β2γ/[2(β1β2 - γ2)(3β1β2 - γ2)(9β1β2 - 4γ2)], where  Φ = β1(α1β2 - α2γ) + 2α1(β1β2 - γ2).  All terms in 
parenthesis are positive in the relevant range because  σ = γ2/β1β2 < 1  and  α1β2 - α2γ = a1(β1β2 - γ2) where a1 > 0 is the 
intercept of the demand for firm 1.  Therefore, Φ > 0, and D1PVI > D1I, D2PVI < D2I.  
 
22  CSPVI – CSI = α2(1.59 - y)(1 - y)(1.23 + y)(2.86 + y)/[8(1 + y)(3 - 2 y)2(3 - y2)2β], where  y = √σ = γ/β.  Therefore  
CSPVI > CSI  for all  y ∈ [0, 1). 
 
23  TSPVI – TSI = α2(1 - y)(1.62 - y)(0.98 - y)(2.47 + 3.1y + y2)/[8(1 + y)(3 - 2y)2(3 - y2)2β], where  y = √σ = γ/β.  
Therefore  TSPVI > TSI  for  0 < σ < 0.98  and  TSPVI < TSI  for  0.98 < σ < 1. 
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4.2 Mergers that Lead from Partial Vertical Integration to Parallel Vertical Integration 
 
 Starting from “partial vertical integration” (i.e., integration of A1 and B1) consider a merger 
between A2 and B2 that leads to parallel vertical integration.  All prices of composite goods decrease  
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as a result of the integration of firms A2 and B2: s1PVI > s1PLVI, p2PVI + q2PVI > s2PLVI.24   
 
 Proposition 3:  Starting with partial vertical integration of firms A1 and B1, a vertical 
merger of firms A2 and B2 leading to parallel vertical integration reduces all prices. 
 
 Total profits of the firms that integrate are higher after integration when the composite 
goods are not close substitutes, Π2PLVI > ΠA2
PVI + ΠB2
PVI  if and only if  σ < 0.59, where  σ = c2/b1b2 = 
γ2/β1β2  measures the degree of substitution between the composite goods.25  Thus, when the 
composite goods are not close substitutes, it pays for firms  A2  and  B2  to merge (given that A1 and 
B1 are already merged).  Profits of the firm that remains integrated fall as a result of the integration 
of the competitors, Π1PLVI < Π1PVI.26 
 
 Proposition 4:  Starting with partial vertical integration of firms A1 and B1, firms A2 and B2 
find a merger with each other profitable if and only if the composite goods A1B1 and A2B2 are not 
close substitutes, that is, iff σ = c2/b1b2 = γ2/β1β2 < 0.59.  The firm that is already integrated is made 
worse off as a result of the subsequent merger. 
 
 Again, to understand the incentives for the vertical merger we need to look carefully at the 
price relationships.  Figure 3 shows the equilibrium prices for composite good 2 as functions of the 
degree of substitution σ for independent ownership, partial vertical integration, parallel vertical 
integration, and joint ownership.  For  σ = 0,  s2j  coincides with  s2PLVI, and  p2i + q2i  coincides with  
p2PVI + q2PVI.  Under partial vertical integration (of firms  A1  and  B1), the second composite good is 
sold at  p2PVI + q2PVI, which lies always below  p2I + q2I  and above  s2PLVI.  For small σ, p2PVI + q2PVI  is 
above  s2J.  As substitution σ increases, competition drives prices down below partial vertical 
integration, and eventually  p2PVI + q2PVI  falls below s2J.  Thus, the reduction in prices resulting from 
the merger of  A2  and  B2  to parallel vertical integration, although beneficial for small σ because it 
brings the composite price closer to the composite price of joint ownership, is detrimental for large 
σ because the composite price in partial vertical integration is already lower than in joint ownership. 
 
 
                                                 
24  s1PVI - s1PLVI = b2c(2a2b1 + a1c)/[2(3b1b2 - c2)(4b1b2 - c2)] > 0,  p2PVI + q2PVI - s2PLVI = b1b2(2a2b1 + a1c)/[(3b1b2 - c2)(4b1b2 - 
c2)] > 0. 
 
25  ΠA2
PVI + ΠB2
PVI - Π2PLVI = b2(4b1b2c2 -2b12b22 - c4)(2a2b1 + a1c)2/[2(3b1b2 - c2)2(4b1b2 - c2)2].  In this expression, all terms 
are positive except for the term in the first set of  parentheses.  This term can be written as  4b1b2c2 - 2b12b22 - c4 = -
(b1b2)2(σ2 - 4σ + 2) = (b1b2)2(3.41 - σ)(σ - 0.59), where  σ = c2/b1b2 = γ2/β1β2.  Since  0 ≤ σ < 1, it follows that  ΠA2PVI + 
ΠB2
PVI < Π2PLVI  for relatively small  σ, σ < 0.59.   
 
26  Π1PVI - Π1PLVI = b1b2c(2a2b1 + a1c)(24a1b1b22 + 14a2b1b2c - 7a1b2c2 - 4a2c3)/[4(3b1b2 - c2)2(4b1b2 -c2)2] = b1b2c(2a2b1 + 
a1c)[a1b2(24b1b2 - 7c2) + 2a2c(7b1b2 - 2c2)]/[4(3b1b2 - c2)2(4b1b2 - c2)2] > 0. 
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 Seen from a different angle, the vertical integration of  A2  and  B2  puts them on equal 
footing with the integrated firm 1, and as a result, the quantity of composite good 2 sold increases.27  
However, this is done at the expense of the increased competition that accompanies vertical 
integration.  When the market environment already allows only small margins because of high 
substitution σ, the decrease in the composite price (due to the increase in competition) is costly to 
the merging firms and is not sufficiently offset by the increase in its sales.  Thus, a vertical merger 
of the second set of firms is undesirable to them when the composite goods are close substitutes.  
The already vertically integrated firm loses as a result of the merger, since both its price and its 
quantity fall.28 
 
 In terms of consumers' surplus, we are again unable to make general comparisons based 
solely on quantities, since the quantities of the different composite goods change in opposite 
directions.  In the case of symmetric demand, we find that consumers’ surplus increases as we 
switch from partial vertical integration to parallel vertical integration.29  Total welfare, TS = CS + Σi 
Πi, also increases for all symmetric demands.30 
 
5. Equilibrium Ownership Structures 
 
 Suppose that firms  A1, B1, A2, and  B2  play a merger game where two firms merge if their 
total post-merger profits are higher.  Assume that firms move simultaneously, and each pair of 
merging firms assumes that the rest of the ownership structure of the rest of the industry does not 
change.  Finally, assume that horizontal mergers are ruled out. 
 
 Clearly, different levels of substitution between the composite goods imply different 
equilibria.  There are three relevant ranges of parameter values.  First, for far substitutes, 0 ≤ σ < 
0.44, a pair of firms producing complementary components prefers to merge irrespective of the 
ownership structure.  Therefore, for far substitutes, the only equilibrium will be parallel vertical 
integration.  Second, for an intermediate range of closer substitutes, 0.44 < σ < 0.59, a pair of 
independent firms producing complementary components prefers to merge if the substitute 
composite good is produced by an integrated firm but not otherwise.  For every level of substitution 
that falls in this case, there are two equilibria: one at parallel vertical integration, and one at 
independent ownership.  Finally, for very close substitutes, 0.59 < σ  < 1, independent firms 
                                                 
27  The quantities sold of composite good 2 under partial vertical integration and under vertical integration are  d2PVI = 
b2(2a2b1 + a1c)/(6b1b2 - 2c2),  d2PLVI = b2(2a2b1 + a1c)/(4b1b2 - c2).  Their difference is  d2PLVI - d2PVI = b2(2a2b1 + a1c)(2b1b2 
- c2)/[(6b1b2 - 2c2)(4b1b2 - c2)] > 0. 
 
28  Its sales under partial vertical integration and under vertical integration are  d1PVI = b1(3a1b2 + 2a2c)/(6b1b2 - 2c2),   
d1PLVI = b1(2a1b2 + a2c)/(4b1b2 - c2).  Their difference is  d1PVI - d1PLVI = b1b2c(2a2b1 + a1c)/[(4b1b2 - c2)(6b1b2 - 2c2)] > 0. 
 
29  CSPLVI - CSPVI = α2(1 - y)(20 + 12y - 5y2 - 4y3)/[8β(y - 2)2(1 + y)(y2 - 3)2] > 0, where  y = √σ = γ/β. 
 
30  TSPLVI - TSPVI = α2(1 - y)(28 - 12y - 23y2 + 4y3 + 4y4)/[8β(y - 2)2(1 + y)(y2 - 3)2)] = α2(1 - y)(y - 1.87)(y - 1.03) (1.53 
+ y)(2.37 + y))/[2β(y - 2)2(1 + y)(y2 - 3)2)] > 0, where  y = √σ = γ/β.  
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producing complementary components will not merge no matter what is the ownership structure in 
the rest of the industry.  Thus, in this case the outcome is independent ownership.  These 
equilibrium results are summarized in the following table. 
 
 Table 1 
 
Substitution Between  Degree of Substitution  Equilibrium Outcome(s) 
the Composite Goods  σ = γ2/β1β2 
  
Far    0 ≤ σ < 0.44   Parallel Vertical Integration 
 
Intermediate   0.44 < σ < 0.59   Independent Ownership and 
Parallel Vertical Integration 
           
Close    0.59 < σ  < 1   Independent Ownership 
 
 
 Proposition 5:  The equilibrium ownership structure is parallel vertical integration when 
the composite goods are close substitutes; it is independent ownership when the composite goods 
are far substitutes; it may be parallel vertical integration or independent ownership for 
intermediate levels of substitution. 
 
 It is interesting to compare profits, consumers’ and total surplus in the region of parameters 
where two equilibria (parallel vertical integration or independent ownership) exist.  General 
comparisons across equilibria are inconclusive since they depend on the relative sizes of the 
demand.  For symmetric demand, profits are lower under parallel vertical integration than under 
independent ownership for the whole ranges of intermediate and close substitution between the 
composite goods.  Therefore in the intermediate range, where both parallel vertical integration and 
independent ownership can be equilibria, profits are higher under independent ownership.31   For 
symmetric demand, the quantities of both goods increase as we switch from independent ownership 
to parallel vertical integration; therefore parallel vertical integration has higher consumers’ 
surplus.32  Moreover, for symmetric demand, total surplus is higher under parallel vertical 
integration than under independent ownership.33  Thus, for symmetric demand, from a total surplus 
                                                 
31  Π1PLVI - (ΠIA1 + Π
I
B1) = β2(36α1
2β14β24 - 132α1α2β14β23γ + 49α22β14β22γ2 - 84α12β13β23γ2 + 226α1α2β13β22γ3 - 56α22β13β2γ4 
+ 95α12β12β22γ4 - 132α1α2β12β2γ5 + 14α22β12γ6 - 48α12β1β2γ6 + 24α1α2β1γ7 + 8α12γ8)/[(9β1β2 - 4γ2)2(β1β2 - γ2)(4β1β2 - 
γ2)2)].  For a symmetric demand system,  Π1PLVI - (ΠIA1 + Π
I
B1) = α
2(1 - y)(y - 1.70)(y - 0.29)/[2β(y - 2)2(y - 1.5)2 (1 + y)], 
where  y = √σ = γ/β.  This is negative for  0.29 < y < 1, i.e., for 0.0741 < σ < 1 which includes the range 0.44 < σ < 0.59 
where two equilibria exist as well as the range 0.59 < σ < 1 where only parallel vertical integration is an equilibrium. 
 
32  In general,  D1PLVI - D1I = β2(6α1β12β22 - 5α2β12β2γ - 6α1β1β2γ2 + 3α2β1γ3 + 2α1γ4)/[(β1β2 - γ2)(4β1β2 - γ2)(9β1β2 - 4γ2)].  
For a symmetric demand system, α1 = α2 = α, β1 = β2 = β, D1PLVI - D1I = α(1 - y)/[β(y - 2)(1 + y)(2y - 3)] > 0, where  y = 
√σ = γ/β. 
33  For symmetric demand, TSPLVI – TSI = α2(7 - 4y)(y - 1)2/[β(y - 2)2(1 + y)(2y - 3)2] > 0 where  y = √σ = γ/β. 
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maximization point of view, parallel vertical integration is desirable over independent ownership, 
for all degrees of substitution among the products, even for the case when the goods are close 
substitutes and parallel vertical integration is not the equilibrium outcome.  Therefore the market 
tends to result in fewer vertical mergers than is socially desirable, at least when the demand is 
symmetric.  
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
 Extending the results of Cournot (1838), this paper shows that the producers of 
complementary components of a composite good that does not have a close substitute have an 
incentive to merge.   This incentive is diminished and eventually it is reversed as the composite 
good faces competition from an increasingly close substitute.  Thus, vertically-related firms that 
face competition from a close substitute prefer to stay unintegrated.  In general, the welfare 
consequences of these vertical mergers are ambiguous.  For the case of a symmetric demand 
system, consumers’ and total surplus increase in both mergers from independent ownership to 
partial vertical integration and from partial vertical integration to parallel vertical integration.  Thus, 
the market provides less vertical integration than is optimal from a social surplus maximizing point 
of view.  The results of this model are expected to generalize to competition in the presence of more 
than one substitutes. 
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